The difference in the nature of the relationship between dialectical reasoning and the natural and metaphysical sciences in Ibn Rushd

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18444217 

This paper provIdes an in-depth analysis of the differing nature of the relationship between dialectical reasoning and both natural science and metaphysical science in the philosophy of Ibn Rushd (Averroes), by examining the methodological and epistemological principles that govern the use and limitations of dialectic within the structure of the sciences, and by addressing the central problem of determining the status of dialectic within the hierarchy of cognitive methods and its legitimacy in attaining certain knowledge. Employing an analytical and critical approach grounded In Ibn Rushd’s major philosophical writings, particularly his Aristotelian commentaries and theological works, the study demonstrates that Ibn Rushd acknowledges the role of dialectical reasoning in natural science as a preliminary and persuasive mode of argumentation, suited to a domain characterized by change, sensory perception, and empirical observation, and therefore compatible with probabilistic and non-demonstrative conclusions, while firmly rejecting the application of dialectic In metaphysics, whichh investigates being qua being, first principles, and ultimate causes, and consequently demands strictly demonstrative and Intellectually certain reasoning. The paper concludes that this distinction reflects Ibn Rushd’s comprehensive hierarchical conception of the sciences and his commitment to methodological rigor aimed at preserving the demonstrative nature of metaphysics, safeguarding philosophical certainty, and preventing epistemological confusion between dialectical and demonstrative forms of reasoning.

Keywords:

Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Dialectical Reasoning, Demonstration (Burhān), Natural Science, Metaphysical Science, Hierarchy of Sciences, Philosophical Method, Aristotelian Commentaries.